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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
WINSLOW C. COLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Vs. 
MARGUERITE D. COLE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
7717 
In addition to the facts presented by Appellant, certain 
other facts, as appear from the various Findings and De-
crees; which make up the record, are pertinent to the issues 
in this case. 
1 
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After having been married to the Plaintiff for a compara-
tively short time, the Defendant, on or about the 24th day 
of July, 1931, in disregard to the solemnity of her marriage 
vows, wilfully and without cause, and against the wish and 
will of the Plaintiff, and without his consent, deserted and 
abandoned the Plaintiff, and that at all times between the 
24th day of July, 1931, and the 19th day of May, 1936, th'! 
Defendant did so continue to wilfully and without cause de-
sert and abandon the Plaintiff, and to live separate and apart 
from him; without any sufficient cause, and against his 
wish, and without his consent. 
That there were no children born the issue of said mar-
riage, so that the alimony awarded was not for the support, 
and education and maintenance of a minor child. 
That despite the fact that the divorce was granted solely 
because of the fault of the Defendant, the Court, neverthe-
less, allowed her a full one-half (1-2) of the community 
property, and in addition required that the Defendant re-
pay to her the sul'll: of $1,323.00, which represented the am· 
ount the Plaintiff had borrowed from the Defendant dur-
ing their married life. In addition, the Defendant was aw-
arded a total of $720.00 in alimony, payable at the rate of 
$60.00 per month; commencing June 1, 1936, and the sum 
of $360.00, payable at the rate of $30.00 per month; com-
mencing June 1, 1937. The record discloses that all of these 
sums have been fully paid. 
The further fact is evident that the application for mod-
ification was made more than fourteen (14) years after the 
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date of the entry of the Decree, and tha! the Plaintiff i-:; 
now of the age of sixty-two (62) years; is married; has a 
son, age 11 and a daughter, age 10, depending on him for 
support. 
That at the time the Decree was entered, the Plain-
tiff received a yearly income, as Sevier River Commis-
sioner, of $2,250.00. That now he receives, as such River 
Commissioner, a salary of $350.00 per month, and that his 
employment is on a yearly basis. That in addition, he re-
ceives approximately $900.00 per year, net income, in the 
farm property. 
In the present proceedings, the Court found that the right 
to permanent alimony, on the part of the Defendant, was 
fully adjudicated in the original divorce proceedings, and 
that the matter should not be reopened in this hearing. 
(Paragraph VII Findings of Fact on Petition for Modifica-
tion of Divorce Decree.) 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant and Appellant listed three (3) points for re-
versal, as follows : 
POINT NO. I. The trial court erred in holding that the 
original Decree finally adjudicated the right of 
the right of the Defendant to alimony. The express 
language of the Decree reserved jurisdiction for 
a subsequent determination of alimony. 
POINT NO. II. The trial court erred in holding that whe-
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ther an award of alimony would seem just and 
equitable ~o the present dependents of the Plain-
tiff was a legal ground to be considered in making 
an award. 
POINT NO. III. The findings of fact of the court show 
that a substantial change in the material circum-
stances of the Plaintiff and Defendant had taken 
place justifying an award of alimony as prayec!, 
and the decision of the court that the evidence 
did not justify an order for alimony was con-
trary to the undisputed facts and to the courts own 
findings. 
Each of these Points will be treated in the order given. 
DEFENDANT APPELLANT'S FIRST POINT 
It is true, as stated by counsel in their Brief, that the 
Plaintiff Respondent in question did not raise the question 
with respect to the right of the Defendant to receive 
an award of alimony, as granted under the original Decree. 
Had the question been raised ,it would have not made any 
difference, one way or the other, since the amount awarded 
in the original Decree was actually paid, and there is no 
way that it could have been recovered from the Defendant 
Appellant. 
In their argument on this point, counsel for Defendant 
Appellant are entirely overlooking the issue in this case, 
and that question is: If the right to permanent alimony 
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was put in issue fully and adjudicated adversely in the 
original proceedings, may the former wife in a later pro-
ceedings, more than fourteen (14) years after, seek a 
Modification of the Decree, so as to award her permanent 
alimony, after the same was denied in the original findings? 
We believe that this question is fully settled in the case 
of Cody vs. Cody, 47 Ut. 556, 154 Pac. 952; Hamilton vs. 
Hamilton, 89 Ut. 554, 58 Pac. 2d. 11. 
Justice Frick in the case of Cody vs. Cody, supra, set 
forth this rule in very concise language. Quoting from 
page 957 of the Pacific Reporter, as follows: 
"I know there are authorities which hold that a final 
judgment for alimony in gross is, even after the 
judgment becomes irreversivle, subject to modifica-
tion on averments and proof of changed conditions 
and circumstances. But I believe the better rule and 
weight of authority to be against such a holding. 
The cases bearing on the question may be found in 
7 Standard Ency. of Procedure, 842; 17 Century Di-
gest, Diveorce, Sec. 692; 7 Decennial Digest, Divorce, 
Sec. 245; 2 Nelson on Divorce, Sees. 933a and 934. 
Except dicta stated in them, there is nothing in 
Read v. Read, 28 Utah, 297, 78 Pac. 675, or Buzzo v. 
Buzzo, 148 Pac. 362, to make against this. If an or-
der allowing alimony in gross, or specific property 
in lieu of all rights in and to the husband's property, 
is final and res ajudicata, and not open to modifica-
tion, except upon averments and proof of fraud, de-
ceit or misrepresentation in procuring the order, 
for just as congent reasons do I think an ajudication 
upon issues and evidence awarding no alimony is 
J1kewise final and set at rest, and not subject to mod-
ification, except on averments and proof of fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation in proucring it." 
The rule as laid down in the above cases has never been 
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modified by the Laws of the State of Utah. 
The cases of Doe vs. Doe, 48 Ut. 200, 158 Pac. 781, and 
Schuster vs. Schuster, 88 Ut. 257, 53 Pac. 2d. 428, cited by 
counsel, have no bearing on this case, as the facts and cir·· 
cumstances in each case are entirely different. Those cases 
merely held that the misconduct of the wife alone was not 
sufficient grounds for the denial of alimony to her, if the 
facts and circumstances of the particular case justified it. 
The case of Alldridge v.s. Alldridge, 229 Pac. 2d., 681 ....... . 
........ Ut ................. , cited by counsel, has no bearing on the 
present case. The Alldridge case merely held that under th~ 
fa.cts and circumstances of that particular case, the Court 
abused its discretion in denying permanent alimony. The 
Alldridge case was a direct appeal from the original Order 
denying alimony in the Decree of Divorce. 
We have no quarrel with the rule of law, that under cer-
tain circumstances a wife may be entitled to alimony, even 
though it is her fault that the marriage failed. The rule is 
well-stated in 1 R.C.L. Sec. 83, page 936 of the volume as 
follows: 
"83. Divorce Granted for Wife's Fault. - According 
to the rule of the common law, where a divorce was 
granted for the misconduct of the wife, she was not 
entitled to alimony. This was productive of so much 
hardship, ho_wever, and so frequently left her a prey 
to starvation or a life of shame, especially where 
her own property had become vested in her husband 
by reason of the marriage, that statutes have been 
enacted in England and a number in the United 
States authorizing the courts to make such an al-
lowance of alimony in favor of a guilty wife as the 
surrounding circumstances may justify. In some in-
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stances, although not allowed in express terms, the 
language of the statute is sufficiently broad to grant 
by Implication such authority. Obviously she is never 
entitled to it as a matter of course, and it is entirely 
discretionary with the court to allow her uch ali-
mony as ,under the circumstances, is reasonable, just, 
and right, taking into consideration the amount of 
the husband's property, and the extent to which she 
contributed to the accumulation thereof, the ability 
of each to earn money in the future, and their con-
duct in the past. The allowance is based not so much 
on the obligation to support, which has been termin-
ated, as on what would be a just division of the 
community property, taking into consideration the 
extent to which the wife assisted in its accumulation. 
If there are not mitigating circumstances and it 
would be inequitable to award her permanent ali-
mony, none should be decreed. Thus where she is 
solely to blame, and neither brought property to her 
husband on marriage nor thereafter contributed to 
its acquisition by her industry and thrift, she is not 
entitled to an allowance of alimony. But where pro-
perty has been jointly acquired largely through her 
efforts, alimony should be awarded even though her 
conduct has been highly improper, especially where 
the husband himself has not been entirely free from 
blame. In a few jurisdictions, however, the law for-
bids the award of alimony where the divorce has 
been decreed because of the wife's adultery." 
The grounds of the Modification of the Decree of Di-
vorce, with respect to alimony, in 1 R.C.L., Alimony, Sec. 
94, at page 948, are as follows: 
"94. Grounds for Modification. - The application for 
an alteration or modification of the decree is always 
addressed to the judicial discretion of the chancellor, 
and ordinarily, in the absence of fraud in its pro-
curement, the only inquiry is whether sufficient 
cause has intervened since the decree to authorize 
or require the court, applying equitable rules and 
principles, to change the allowance. Authority to 
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modify the allowance, however, does not include the 
right to alter the award upon the state of case ex-
isting when the decree was entered, or to review the 
action of the chancellor therein. The parties had 
th~ir day in court, with the right of appeal if the 
decree was deemed erroneous, and it cannot be sup-
posed that is was intended that the court should 
sit in review of its own decree, or that the same or 
some succeeding chancellor presiding in the same 
court should, after the lapse of indefinate time, 
have power to reverse, alter, or modify a decree for 
alimony upon the facts existing at the time of its 
entry. After divorce, a husband should be free to 
act in reliance on the finality of the award deter-
mining the extent of his obligation, -----------------------------· _ 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------· As an al-
lowance of alimony in gross is in full discharge and 
satisfaction for all claim for future support of the 
wife, it cannot be subsequently altered, for the pow-
er of modification is not applicable ·under such 
circumstances, though the contrary has been held in 
at least one jurisdiction." 
DEFENDANT APPELLANT'S SECOND POINT 
There is absolutely no merit to Defendant Appellant's 
contention that the present dependents of the Plaintiff Res-
pondent cannot be taken into consideration in an application 
for modification of a decree awarding alimony. This rule 
is clearly stated in 27 C.J .S. at page 995 under the sub-
title, "Remarriage of Husband", as folllows: 
"The remarriage of the husband to another does 
not preclude modification of the amount of alimony 
decreed to his wife. On the contrary, such remar-
riage is a circumstance to be considered on an ap-
plication for modification, and may warrant a re-
duction to enable him to fulfill his obligation to 
support his second wife and his children by his 
second wife." 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Counsel cites the annotations contained in 30 A.L.R. 79; 
64 A. L. R. 1269, and 12 A. L. R. 246, as supporting their 
contention that a remarriage and contraction of new oblig-
ations does not constitute a fact to be considered in an ap-
plication for modification of the divorce decree, with res-
pect to alimony, is not born out by the annotations cited 
in those cases. 
Typical of the cases cited under the annotation of 30 
A.L.R., at pages 80 and 81, are the following two cases: 
"Thus, in Buckminster v. Buckminster, (1865) 38 
Vt. 248, 88 Am. Dec. 652, where additional alimony 
was refused on the application of the divorced wife, 
some of the grounds stated where that the husband 
had remarried and had children by his second wife, 
which were young; that what property he had, had 
been acquired since his second marriage; and that 
he was getting old. The court said that as a matter 
of sound policy, where husband and wife are divor-
ced, the wife should not be encouraged to think 
she has a continuing lien on her divorced husband 
for support, but that, on the contrary, the divorce 
and decree of alimony should be understood, as be-
tween them. to end their relations and obligations to 
each other." 
"In Berrett v. Berrett (1914) 80 Wash. 474, 141 Pac. 
1158, the court recognized the rule down in State 
ex rei. Brown v. Brown (1903) 31 Wash. 397, 62 L.R. 
A. 974, 72 Pac. 86, that a husband is bound to pay 
alimony to a former wife, notwithstanding the fact 
that he has remarried, but said that the court had 
never intended to go so far as to hold that a divorced 
all his earnings must go to his first wife, and rever-
sed an order increasing the alimony of the first wife 
person has no right to remarry, or that, if he does, 
where the circumstances made such increase inequi-
table." 
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One of the most fundamental principles involved in :t 
matter of this kind concerns the obligation of a husband to 
support his wife. That obligation is terminated the moment 
that a wife deserts her husband, without cause. This matter 
is thoroughly annotated at 6 A.L.R. 9. The rule is also 
amply stated in the case of Nelson v. Nelson, decided in 
the Supreme Court of Utah in 1919, and reported in 182 Pac. 
at page 386. Therefore, when the Defendant deserted -::he 
Plaintiff on the 24th day of July, 1931, without his consent; 
wilfully, and without case, and against the will and wish 
of the Plaintiff, the obligation to support her, then and 
there, ceased. Any obligation after that date to pay the 
Defendant anything on the part of the Defendant, must 
arise out of the terms and conditions of the Decree of Di-
vorce, the obligation to support having been terminated. 
Then the property rights, whether in the form of alimony, 
or otherwise, would have to be determined on what would 
be a just division o fthe community property, taking into 
consideration the extent to which the wife had assisted in 
its accumulation. Under the general rule, where the wife 
is solely to blame and neither brought property to her hus-
band on marriage, or thereafter contributed to its acquisi-
tion by her industry and thrift, she is not entitled to ali-
mony. In he present case, the facts disclose that any prop-
erty, which the wife paid to the husband at the time of the 
marriage, was repaid in full, and that in addition, she re-
ceived one-half (1-2) of the full value of the property of the 
husband, as well as a settlement of alimony in gross, even 
though the same were payable in installments. Under the 
facts and circumstances of the case, this certainly fulfilled 
the full obligation of the Plaintiff to his former wife. 
10 
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In addition, the matter of alimony, as well as any rule 
for modification for an order of alimony, rests in the 
sound discretion of the court, and in the absence of the 
clear abuse of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will 
not be disturbed on appeal. This matter is clearly stated in 
27 C.J .S. at pages 1107 to 1109, under sub-section C of sec-
tion 288, in the following language : 
"Discretionary orders as to alimony or allowances 
in divorce actions are reviewable, but unless the 
trial court has abused its discretion, the appellate 
court will not disturb a decision as to temporary 
alimony, permanent alimony, modification of ali-
mony, or counsel fees and expenses." 
A like rule is stated in 1 R.C.L., at page 929, in the fol-
lowing manner: 
"77. Amount of Allowance. - The determination of 
the amount of permanent alimony is controlled by 
no fixed standard, but rests rather, in the sound 
discretion of the court." 
In addition, there is a presumption of the correctness 
of the order. The rule in that respect being stated in 27 
C.J .S. at page 1110, in the following language: 
"The general rule is that every intendment will 
be made in favor of the order appealed from. It 
will be presumed that the proper procedural steps 
were taken, that the court acted after due con-
sideration, that the court considered all the evidence 
to warrant the court's findings or order, particularly 
where the record does not contain the evidence." 
The same rule is supported by the Utah cases. Particularly 
11 
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the case of Read v. Read, 28 Ut. 297 78 Pac. 673, was quoted 
and approved in the case of Blair v. Blair, 40 Ut. 306 121 
Pac. 19; at page 21 of the Pacific Recorder, as follows: 
"The awarding of alimony and fixing the amount 
thereof are questions the determination of which 
rests within the sound discretion of the trial court; 
and, unless it is made to appear that there has been 
an abuse of discretion on the part of the court in 
dealing with one or both of these questions, its 
judgment and orders granting and fixing the ali-
mony will not be disturbed." 
The Blair case also lays down clearly the rules by which 
alimony is determined. In the Blair case, the Court, after 
quoting the general rules with respect to the determination 
of the amount of alimony, went on to say: 
"To the foregoing statement we can add nothing 
except to say that the courts, under certain circum-
stances, may also take into consideration the char-
acter of the husband's property; that is, whether it 
is productive or not, and whether the wife has as-
sisted him in its accumulation or otherwise." 
The trial court, in his discretion, found that it would 
be unjust and inequitable to make an Order requiring the 
Plaintiff, who is sixty-two (62) years of age, to contribute 
to the support of a former wife, who was divorced from 
him because of her desertion more than fourteen (14) years 
prior to her application for modification of the Decree. Such 
an order was not an abuse of discretion. Had the rule of the 
Court been that the Plaintiff be required, at this time, to 
contribute to the support of his former wife, under the facts 
and circumstances as disclosed by the record, such an order 
12 
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would have been, clearly, an abuse of discretion, and con-
trary to public policy. 
DEFENDANT APPELLANT'S THIRD POINT 
The is nothing disclosed in the record as to the changed 
condition of the parties, which would now require the 
Plaintiff to pay Defendant additional alimony, if there 
were no other circumstances affecting her right thereto. 
It has been shown under the facts and circumstances of 
this case that the Defendant is not entitled to alimony 
for her support at this time, and the changed conditions of 
the parties are not such as would justify such support. 
It is true that the Defendant now finds herself in dis-
tressing circumstances, but none of this is the fault of th~ 
Plaintiff. Furthermore, the alleged improvement in the 
condition of the Plaintiff actually is not very great. In 
fact, he is less able to respond in alimony than he was at 
the time the Decree was entered. The Court must, of neces-
sity, know of th increased Federal and State taxes that are 
levied against the income of an individual, and must know 
of the decline in the purchasing power of the dollar, so 
that it is now extremely doubtful whether a salary of $350.00 
per month, which is the amount of the salary now received 
by the Plaintiff, would come as near providing a living as 
the salary of $187.50,. which he received at the time the 
divorce was granted. The Court found that the Plaintiff 
has farming lands and water stock of the value of $37,857.00, 
but the net income therefrom is only $900.00 per year. In 
addition, the Plaintiff is now more than sixty-two (62) 
years of age; is soon approaching the age when he will be 
13 
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forced into retirement, and will no longer receive the 
salary, which he is now receiving. Under these circum-
stances, to take from him the small accumulation of prop-
erty, which he has acquired without the help or assistance 
from his former wife, and deprive his present wife, who 
has assisted in the acquirement of this property, of her 
just support, and deprive his minor children of the neces-
sities of life in order to award the same to a former wife, 
who lived with the Plaintiff but a short time, and then 
deserted him without cause, and at the time of the divorce 
received a full one-half (1-2) of the property acquired dur-
ing the marriage, would constitute a situation, which would 
shock the conscience of any fair-minded person. If anyone 
is required to seek public assistance under the Welfare 
Laws of the State of Utah for support, it should be the for-
mer wife, who was the guilty party, and not the present wife 
and children of the Plaintiff, or the Plaintiff himself. 
The Plaintiff submits that the order of the trial court, 
refusing the Petition of the Defendant for mo~ification 
of the Decree of Divorce, should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DUDLEY CRAFTS, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
~nd Respondent. 
14 
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